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COM(83)  26  final COMMISSION  COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  COUNCIL  ON  NEGOTIATIONS  FOR 
A NEW  INTERNATIONAL  SUGAR  AGREEMENT 
I.  The  International  Sugar  Council  (ISC)  met  in London  on  18/19 November 
and  decided  to  ask UNCTAD  to arrange  a  conference  in Geneva  next May 
with a  view to negotiating  a  new  international  sugar  agreement  to  come 
into force  on  1  January  1984. 
The  ISC  also  decided  to entrust  the  preparations  for  the  forthcoming 
conference  to  a  new  Preparatory Committee,  on which  the  European 
Economic  Community will sit as  a  full member. 
2.  The  Council  (the  EEC  Council,  that  is)  asked  the  Commission  on 
27  October  1981  to explore with  the  ISC  means  of  cooperation which 
would  enable  the  Community  to become  a  member  of  a  new,  improved  sugar 
agreement.  Accordingly  the  Commission  announced  at  the  ISC  meeting, 
on behalf of  the  Community,  that  the  EEC  wished  to  take  part  on  an 
equal  footing with  the other participants  in the work  of  the Preparatory 
Committee  and  the May  negotiations. 
3.  The  draft decision  (Annex  I)  transmitted  to  the  Council  herewith gives 
the Commission  authorization  to participate, with  the  support  of 
the Article  113  Committee,  in the  work  being undertaken by  the 
International  Sugar Organization and  in the  planned UNCTAD-sponsored 
conference  in May  with  a  view  to  setting up  a  new  international  sugar 
agreement  which  the  Community  could  join. RBCOMMENDATION  FOR  A 
COUNCIL  DECISION 
ANNEX  I 
laying  down  guidelines  for  the negotiation of  a  new  international 
sugar  agreement 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the Treaty establishing  the European  Economic  Community, 
and  in particular Article  113  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the Recommendation  from  the  Commission, 
Whereas  the  Community  should  take part  in  the  preparatory work  and 
negotiations for  a  new  international  sugar  agreement  to  replace  the 
International  Sugar  Agreement  of  1977, 
HAS  DECIDED  AS  FOLLOWS: 
Article  I 
The  Commission  is hereby authorized  to  take  part  in the  preparatory work 
and negotiations for  a  new  international  sugar  agreement. 
Article  2 
The  Commission shall  take part  in the negotiations  in consultation with  the 
Article  113  Committee  and  in accordance with  the  guidelines  contained  in 
the Annex. 
~or the  Council 
The  President ANNEX  II 
EXPLANATORY  MEMORANDUM  AND  NEGOTIATING  DIRECTIVES  FOR  PARTICIPATION  BY 
THE  EEC  IN  THE  RENEGOTIATION  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  SUGAR  AGREEMENT 
1.  The  decision by  the  International  Sugar  Council  on  19  November  to bring 
forward  by  a  year  the  renegotiation of  the  1977  International  Sugar 
Agreement  (which  theoretically runs  until 31  December  1984)  is 
essentially due  to  the critical situation of  the market  in the  last 
two  years  or  so  and  the  inability of  the  members  of  the  Agreement 
to  take  any  radical  counter-measures  going  beyond  their actual 
obligations  under  the Agreement. 
2.  There  is  a  wild  imbalance  between  supply  and  demand  on  the world market 
for  sugar;  in the  1981/82  and  1982/83  crop  years  production outstripped 
requirements  by  13m  tonnes;  stocks  stood at 37-38  m tonnes,  a  level 
not  attained since  1945,  which  is  equivalent  to  almost  40%  of world 
consumption  (25%  is generally regarded  as  the  ideal  level). 
This  serious  state of  affairs is depressing world  prices,  now  at 
6-7  cents  a  pound;  this  is  the  lowest  price in constant  dollars 
recorded for  over  forty years,  only half  of  the minimum  price  (13  cents 
per pound)  set by  the Agreement. 
3.  Given  the  current  and  foreseeable  state of  the world market,  it is 
becoming  increasingly  imperative  to establish a  new,  effective 
international  agreement;  the  present  confusion is  damaging  to 
producers,  exporters  and  importers  alike,  including  the  Community. 
4.  The  Community  is expected  to  play  a  major  constructive  role  in the 
forthcoming  negotiations;  it is the  second  largest exporter,  after 
Cuba,  and  has  special  links with a  number  of  developing-country  sugar 
exporters  (from which it also  imports  1.3 m tonnes  under  the  Sugar 
Protocol  annexed  to  the Lome  Convention),  but was  not  a  member  of 
the  previous Agreements  (1968  and  1977),  regarding  them  as - 2  -
ineffective,  and  inimical  to  the  interests of its growers  and 
consumers. 
The  Community  must  therefore  go  into  the negotiations  prepared to  look 
at  the  objectives  and measures  proposed  by  other participants  on their 
merits.  However,  it should  press  for  the  acceptance  of  a  number  of 
basic principles which it feels  to  be  essential if the  future  agreement 
is  to be  able  to regulate  the world  sugar market  more  effectively. 
Since what  ~s  contemplated  is  a  new  agreement,  rather  than  a  revised 
version of  the  present Agreement  dating  from  1977,  all possibilities 
may  reasonably be  considered. 
The  lessons  of  the  1977  Agreement 
5.  The  members  of  the  1977  Agreement  voted  to start negotiations  for  a  new 
accord  a  year  early because  they,  like  the  Community,  feel  that  the 
present  system is  ineffective  and  unsatisfactory - largely,  indeed, 
precisely because  the  Community  has  remained  outside it - and  therefore 
want  a  new  arrangement  in which  the  EEC  would  participate. 
6.  During  the  lifetime  of  the present  Agreement  world  prices  have  rarely 
stayed within  the  prescribed bracket.  From  January  1978,  when  the 
Agreement  came  into force,  to  I  January  1983  - sixty months  - prices 
were within  the accepted  range  for  twelve  months  and  below  (January  1978 
- September  1979  and  September  1981  onwards)  or  above  (May  1980-
January  1981)  for  forty-eight.  The  market  has  undergone  two  upheavals: 
~n 1980,  when  prices were  up  to  double  the Agreement  ceiling of 
21  cents  per  pound,  and  this year,  with prices having  slumped  to  under 
half  of  the  13  cents per  pound  regarded  as  the  acceptable minimum. 
It is clear  that  ~n neither of  these  extreme  situations has  the 
machinery  of  the Agreement  functioned  as  it was  meant  to;  in  1980  the 
release of  special  stocks  proved  inadequate  to  curb  rising prices, 
while  in  1981/82,  it was  impossible  to  cut  export  quotas  enough  to 
influence_the market  and  support  prices at an acceptable  level. 
Undeniably,  then,  the  1977  Agreement  has  fallen decidedly short  of  its 
main objective of  achieving "stable conditions  in the  international 
trade  in sugar,  including  avoidance  of  excessive price fluctuations". - 3  -
It has  not been markedly more  successful  in achieving  its other 
objectives  (raising  the  level  of  trade  and  increasing  the market  shares 
of  the developing  countries)  either. 
7.  To  some  extent  the  failure of  the  1977  Agreement  was  implicit  in the 
outcome  of  the  actual negotiations. 
Weightier  reasons  for  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  Agreement,  however, 
are  the  following. 
(i)  !~~~~g~~!~-g~~!~-E~B~!~!!~~-~~£~i~~E~ 
(a)  the  quotas  were  set  too  high  fr.om  the  outset  as most  of  the 
members  exported flat  out  in  1976  and  1977  to maximize  the past 
performance  level  on  which  the  quotas  were  to  be  based; 
(b)  there was  also  a  "mistake"  in the  text of  the Agreement  which 
meant  that  the method  used  for  revision of  the  basic export 
tonnages  (BETs)  produced  levels well  above  actual world  demand, 
or  indeed  the export  capacity of  some  of  the members; 
(c)  the maximum  permitted cut of  15%  in BETs  proved  inadequate  to 
remedy matters. 
As  a  result of  all these factors,  export  quotas  in  1982,  for 
example,  totalled  16.5 m tonnes,  compared  with  a  demand  (global 
quota)·level  of  12.1  m tonnes. 
In  the  light of  this  situation,  ~s  there  any  point  in opening 
negotiations  for  a  future  agreement  based  on  a  quota mechanism? 
The  feeling  is that  the  exporting countries  cannot  afford  to  lose 
face  with domestic public  opinion by  giving  up  "rights"  enshrined 
in the  1977  Agreement. 
Again,  it  ~s reasonable  to wonder  whether  any  generalized  quota I 
- 4  -
mechanism,  however  refined,  can  cope  with  the  conditions  on  the 
international  sugar market. 
The  stockholding  system was  tacked  on  at  the  end  of  the  1977  negotiating 
conference  to  reinforce  the quota mechanism,  but it has  failed  to  perform 
the usual  functions  of  a  buffer  stock  in anticipating shortages  (1980)  or 
suppc.rting  prices  (1979  and  1981/82),  partly because  the  level  of  stocks  was 
too  low  (2.5 m  tonnes)  and  the nature  of  the  stocking  and  destocking  trigger 
mechanisms  unsuitable  (regularity  - control)  and  partly because  the United 
States was  late in ratifying the Agreement,  which  delayed  the  setting up  of 
the  Stock Financing Fund,  thus  reducing  the  real  level  of  the  stocks 
(approx.  2m tonnes)  at  the  time  of  the  1980  crisis. 
The  developed  importing members  of  the  Agreement  did undertake  to  allow 
growing  access  to  their markets  for  sugar  from  the  developing  countries,  one 
of  the objectives  of  the Agreement,  but  in practice  the  reverse  has 
occurred.  The  three  countries mainly  concerned  (Canada,  the United  States 
and  Japan  and  the  other developed  importing  countries1  have  in fact 
considerably cut  back  on  their  imports  since  the  Agreement  carne  into  force, 
owing  to  the  lncrease  ln isoglucose  production by  the  three big  importers, 
and  this has hit hardest at  the  developing  countries'  exports  of  raw  sugar. 
(iv)  The  system of  ~E~~~~!-~EE~~g~~~~~~ set up  to  accommodate  most  of  the 
centralized economies  has  also  contributed  to  the  instability of  the world 
market.  The  USSR  and  East Germany,  which  are  importing members,  can also 
export  on  to  the free  world  market  a  certain quantity controlled by  the 
Agreement.  Sugar  can  also  be  traded without  being  counted against  the 
BETs:  Cuba  is  allowed  to  export  about  4  m  tonnes  a  year  to  Comecon 
countries  under  this arrangement,  and  up  to  800  000  tonnes  to other 
social.ist countries  (Albania,  China,  North Korea,  Vietnam  and  ''{ugosiavia). 
Imports  (raw value): 
; 977  '982  (x)  ~ifference  --
USA 
~~  290  751  J  2  713  000  -49% 
CAN  l 18  470  315  000  ·-[ 7% 
NZ  184  800  169  000  - 9% 
JAP  2  789  413 
')  139  000  -23%  L.. 
FIN  190  180  120  000  -37% 
SWD  59  407  50  000  -16% 
(x)  ISO  estimates 
Nov.  1982 - 5  -
The  socialist countries  in turn  can export  freely to Comecon  countries 
which  are not  members  of  the Agreement  and  are  therefore able  to re-
export  the  sugar  on  to  the  world  market  without  restriction.  Sugar  from 
Cuba  is thus  arriving on  the world market via Comecon  countries totally 
outside  the  control of  the International  Sugar Agreement. 
(v)  Similarly,  the  E~:~~2~E£~£~~~-~f-~~S~E_£y_~~E~E£~~g-~~~~!E~~~ is 
hindering  the  free market.  The  United States provides  an  example  of  the 
sort of  abuses  that  occur:  in 1981,  it re-exported  over  a  million 
tonnes, 'whereas  previously it had  never  gone  over  200  000  tonnes. 
(vi)  Another  problem has  been  the  fact  that  £~~-~~~-~~-~~E-~-~~~£~E-~f 
E~~-~gE~~~~~£, both  importers  and  exporters having  felt  - whether  rightly 
or wrongly,  that  is not  the  point  - that  the  Community  was  free  to  do  as 
it liked while  they were  subject  to very  rigorous  production and 
marketing restrictions. 
This has  undoubtedly been  a  factor  in  tempting  the members  of  the 
Agreement  to confine  their efforts  to  the  strict letter of  their 
obligations,  even  though  the  Community's  own  behaviour  in the  last  two 
years at least has  been exemplary. 
The  world  sugar market 
World  production of  and  trade  in sugar  is  characterized by  three basic features: 
L.  though  a  great many  countries at  totally different  levels  of  development 
are  sugar  producers,  a  handful  of  "majors"  in fact  account  for  the bulk 
of  the world  tradable  supply; 
LL.  the world market  has  become  ever  more  clearly split into a  raw  sugar 
market  and  a  white  sugar market,  each with their separate characteristics 
and  economic  considerations; 
LLL.  world  demand  is  steadily increasing:  reduction in certain developed 
countries more  than  compensated  for  by  the  increase  in the  developing 
countries,  whereas  world  production is  subjected  to  annual variations. - 6  -
Before  the  Second  World War  world  production was  under  30  m tonnes. 
It soared  in the  twenty years  after that,  and  now  stands  at  around  100 
m tonnes  (raw value). 
There  are  114  producing countries  in all,  8  of  them  growing  both cane 
and beet  (including  the United  States,  China  and  Spain),  34  growing 
beet  alone  (European  countries  and  the  USSR)  and  72  cane  alone. 
Sugar  is thus  grown  almost  everywhere  - a  well-nigh universal  crop. 
However,  that  ~s a  statement which has  to  be  heavily qualified,  as  in 
fact very  few  producing  countries  account  for  a  dominant  share  of 
world  output. 
The  six leading  producers  produce  almost  55%  of  the  world  total;  they 
are:  EEC  (15.7  m  tonnes),  Brazil  (8.2  m tonnes),  USSR  (6.2  m tonnes), 
Cuba  (8.2  m tonnes),  India  (9.2  m tonnes)  and  the  USA  (5.7  m  tonnes) 
in 1981-82  (raw value); 
Of  those  s~x countries  three are  permanent  net  exporters with 
structural  surpluses:  the  EEC,  Brazil  and  Cuba. 
The  USSR  and  the  USA  head  the list of  importers,  each with  a  production 
shortfall against consumption of  over  5.5  and  2.5 m tonnes  respectively. 
India's production levels  are erratic so  that  although it is normally 
an exporter,  there  are years  in which it becomes  an  importer. 
Eleven countries  (if  to  the  six countries mentioned  above  are  added 
Australia  (3.5 m t),  South Africa  (2m t),  the  Philippines  (2.4 m t), 
Thailand  (1.7  m t)  and  China  (3.5  m t))  produce  two-thirds  of  the 
world's  cane  and  beet  sugar. 
are net exporters. 
But  only  six of  them  (including India) 
The  dominant  position of  these  "sugar  superpowers"  is reflected within 
the  ISO,  which recognizes  44  countries  as  exporting members  of  the 
Agreement,  41  of  them  developing  countries. - 7  -
Of  the  44,  15  are 
11Annex  II
11  countries,  i.e.  countries  exporting under 
70  000  tonnes  a  year  and  entitled to  produce  and  export  sugar  free  of 
any restriction up  to  that  limit,  which  has  never  been exceeded.  Of 
the  15: 
5  countries  (Haiti,  Indonesia,  Uganda,  Pakistan,  Venezuela) 
are actually net  importers; 
9  countries are net exporters,  but  their combined  annual  exports 
are barely over  300  000  tonnes; 
Yugoslavia  alone  regularly exports  about  the  limit,  and  would  like 
to  increase  its export  entitlement  to  around  150  000  tonnes. 
The  29 other exporting countries,  listed  in Annex  I, are  theoretically 
more  important  suppliers,  and  their exports  on  the world market  are 
subject  to  a  ceiling or  quota  set at  a  level  approximating  to  a 
notional  export  entitlement known  as  the basic export  tonnage  (BET). 
Of  the  29  countries  a  mere  eight account  for  86%  of  the  combined  BETs 
(Argentina,  Australia,  Brazil,  Cuba,  Dominican Republic,  Philippines, 
South Africa,  Thailand),  but  of  those  eight,  again,  three  alone 
(Australia,  Brazil  and  Cuba)  account  for  56%. 
At  the  lower  end  of  the  scale,  9  of  the  exporting members  of  the 
Agreement  have  been unable  to  fulfil  their quota: 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Mauritius  and  Jamaica  are  ACP  States  covered by 
the Lome  Convention  sugar protocol  and  their exports  on  the world 
market  are negligible; 
Mexico  (structural reasons)  and  Peru  (structural reasons  and  climate) 
have  a  production shortfall equal  to  their export  quotas; 
Bolivia,  Ecuador  and El  Salvador are  structurally  incapable  of 
fulfilling their quotas,  and  export  less  than  70  000  tonnes  a  year; - 8  -
India,  with its erratic  prod~ction and  consumption  curves,  1s  a 
special case.  In very  good  years  like  1976  and  1982,  India can export 
up  to  a  million tonnes,  but it had  to  import  in  1980. 
The  above  observations point  to  an  important  consideration to  be  taken 
into  account  in working  out  a  new  agreement:  the  great majority of 
sugar  producers,  and  particularly the  developing  countries,  other  than 
Cuba,  Brazil,  India,  Philippines  and  the Dominican Republic,  could  be 
more  or  less  exempt  from  the disciplines it would  impose  without  causing 
any real problems. 
An  agreement  between  the  EEC,  India,  Australia,  Brazil  and  Cuba,  on  the 
other hand,  would  cover  42%  of  world  production  and  almost  70%  of 
international  trade  and  thus  have  a  much  stronger  influence. 
Analysis  of  the world market  is usually based  on general  production  and 
consumption figures  for  sugar as  a  whole,  making  no  distinction between 
raw  and  white  sugar.  On  closer  examination,  however,  it can  be  seen 
that  there  are  in fact  two  separate markets,  increasingly divergent  and 
independent  of  each other: 
(a)  price movements  differ; 
(b)  the market  trends are not  the  same;  the volume  of  international 
trade  in refined  sugar has  doubled  over  the  last  twelve  years, 
while  the  level of  trade  in raw  sugar has  remained  stable; 
(c)  the pattern of  supply and  demand  is different;  1n  1981,  77 
countries were  importing white  sugar  from  17  exporting  countries, 
while only  27  countries  (four of  them  accounting  for  over  60%) 
imported  raw  sugar. 
On  the market  for white  sugar  the  Community  is  important  if not 
irreplaceable,  accounting  for  60%  of  world  supplies;  other exporters, 
such  as  Brazil or  India,  only export white  sugar when  the price - 9  -
the price differential makes  refining worthwhile. 
Suggestions  for  the negotiation of  a  new  international  sugar  agreement 
One  thing is certain,  the  Community  should  approach  the  forthcoming  negotiations 
as  an exporting  country.  In this  capacity  the  Community  has  a  strong interest 
in seeing  the negotiations  culminate  in  an effective  agreement. 
Given its actual  and  potential role  on  the market,  the  Community  is well 
placed- better than in 1977,  in any  case,  when  it became  a  net  exporter  for  the 
f .  .  1  h  .  f  1rst t1me  - to  ave  an 1n  luence  on  the  type  of  agreement  worked  out, 
particularly since an  agreement  now  without  the  Community  as  a  member  would  be 
even more  irrelevant  than  the  1977  one. 
(a)  Q'£i~£!.h:~~ 
While  the  new  agreement  should  set out  essentially the  same  objectives  as 
the present  one  (stability of  price and  supplies,  if possible  an  expansion 
of  trade,  priority for  developing  countries,  better coordination of 
marketing policies)  the  Community  should  also press  for  acceptance  of  the 
following  ideas: 
i.  coverage of  substitutes  such  as  isoglucose; 
ii.  overall market  transparency;  the  special  arrangements  for  Cuba  and  the 
socialist countries  should  be  just as  open as  those  covering EEC 
imports  from  ACP  countries; 
111.  acknowledgement  of  the existence of  two  markets,  for white  and  raw 
sugar,  with  the necessary  implications  for  regulatory  and  price 
provisions; 
iv.  greater participation by  developed  importing  countries  1n  the market 
regulatory mechanisms. 
I  > 
Actually,  the  six-member  Community  was  more  or  less  always  a  net  exporter. 
The  reason it appears  otherwise  is that figures  for  the Nine  are quoted  even 
for  the period before the first enlargement.  And  even  the  nine-member 
Community's  gradual  transformation from  importer  to  exporter is partly  due 
to  the decline  in UK  imports  from  some  former  suppliers  of  the  Community. - 10  -
(b)  ~~~~~-~~2~2~i~-~EE~~g~~~~~~ 
Considering both  the market  situation  (particularly as  regards  the  pattern 
of  trade  flows  and  the  type  of  disciplines which various  countries might 
accept  or  have  imposed  on  them  in the  interests  of  more  effective market 
stabilization,  the  Commission's  view  is  that not all members  of  a  future 
agreement  should  be  subject  to  the  same  rules.  To  some  extent,  in fact, 
the  present  Agreement  already provides  for  differential undertakings,  as 
regards  special  stocks,  for  example  (not mandatory  for  the  Annex  II minor 
exporters),  or quotas. 
Generally  speaking,  the  Commission believes  that  the objectives  of  the 
agreement  should  be  pursued  in different ways  depending  on  the  status of  the 
particular member: 
1.  the maJor  exporters  and  developed  importing  countries  should establish 
a  system of  nationally-held buffer  stocks  coordinated at  international 
level  and  backed  up  if necessary by  auxiliary measures  to  regulate 
supply  and  demand,  to  be  adopted after consultations; 
ii.  the middle-rank exporters  would  have  export  quotas  backed  up  by  a 
limited special  stock arrangement; 
111.  the other exporting  countries would  be  free  to  sell their  sugar at  any 
time,  up  to  a  tonnage  to  be  determined  (of  the  order  of  the  70  000 
tonne  limit set in the  1977  Agreement). 
The  a1m  would  be  to  see  that  the market  could move  freely within a  certain 
price bracket;  stocking or destocking  operations  and  the  introduction or 
removal  of  quotas,  followed  if necessary  by  measures  to  control  supply  and 
demand,  would  be  used  to  deal  with crises  and  ensure  a  return  to  stability 
(i.e.  prices within  the  bracket)  as  soon  as  possible. 
(I)  The  major  exporters 
The  countries  in question would  be  Argentina,  Australia,  Brazil,  Cuba, 
the Dominican Republic,  the  EEC,  India,  Philippines,  South Africa  and 
Thailand. - 11  -
For  these countries,  which  dominate  the market,  accounting for 
approximately 80%  of  trade,  there would  be  a  system based  on  an 
international  stockholding policy plus  back-up measures  to regulate 
production and  consumption policies. 
The  major  exporters  would  undertake collectively to regulate their 
exports,  when  the  state of  the market  made  it necessary,  by 
accumulating or releasing national  stocks  in an  internationally-
coordinated operation. 
The  aggregate  level of  stocks  held  or  released  under  the  agreement 
should  be  of  the order of  5-6 m tonnes,  apportioned  among  the 
countries  concerned  during  the negotiations  in line with their 
total  exports  and  production.  The  Community  should be  in a 
position to  announce  that it will  take  about  2  m tonnes. 
The  machinery  for  the  accumulation,  holding  and  release of  stocks, 
which would  be  linked  to  the  fluctuation of market  prices  in  terms 
of  a  given price bracket  (like the  quota  and  special  stock 
arrangements  in the  present Agreement),  should  be  as  flexible  as 
possible while  still giving  commercial  operators  a  measure  of 
security to  plan ahead.  Thus,  when  world market  prices  reached  a 
certain level within the bracket,  these countries would  meet  to 
decide whether  and  to what  extent  to  go  ahead  collectively with 
national  stocking or destocking  operations. 
To  enable  the  stockholding mechanism  to  function  as  efficiently as 
possible,  these  countries would  continue,  as  under  the  1977 
Agreement,  to notify the Secretariat periodically of  their real 
exportable  supplies  (including  sugar  reserved  for  the  controlled 
markets)  and,  if possible,  their export  commitments.  They  would 
also  have  to notify the  Secretariat of  the policies  being pursued 
on  the domestic  front  to  enable  them  to fulfil their national  and 
international  stocking obligations  and  the  level of  any  current 
minimum  stocks  they hold which  are not  covered  by  agreement  rules. - 12  -
(ii)  ~~~~:~E-~~~~~E~~ 
If  in spice of  the buffer  stock actions world market  prices 
continued  towards  further  predetermined  points  on  the  price  scale, 
decisions  on  the  complementary measures  to  be  adopted  by  each 
large exporting  and  importing  country  in  the  field  of  production 
and  consumption policy would  be  taken by  the  Council  of  the 
Agreement.  These measures  would  be  entered  in a  schedule  to  the 
agreement;  they  could  consist,  in the  event  of  a  surplus,  for 
instance,  of  a  reduction in areas  under  cultivation,  the establishment 
of  supplementary reserve  stocks  entailing orderly marketing  of 
exports,  measures  to  promote  consumption  (use  in animal  feed)  or 
a  switch in production in  some  areas  from  sugar  to gasohol. 
(2)  Middle-rank  exporters 
These  countries export  less  than 500  000  tonnes  a  year;  most  of  them 
are Latin American  or  Central American developing  countries.  The  vast 
majority of  them  have consistently favoured  an  agreement  based  on  a 
system of  export  quotas,  since for  financial  and  administrative  reasons 
it is often extremely difficult for  them  to  implement  proper  stockholding 
policies.  A quota mechanism,  on  the  other  hand,  gives  them  a  degree 
of  flexibility over production  and  also  offers  them  a  measure  of 
security in  implementing  their production  and  export  plans,  which  is 
important  for  developing  countries. 
Given  these countries'  v~ews and  general  situation,  the Commission 
considers  they  could  carry on with  a  system of  export  quotas  combined 
with a  limited undertaking  on  stocks,  as  under  the  present Agreement. 
However,  the mechanism calls  for  two  improvements: 
(a)  the  BETs  should be  set at  a  realistic level  reflecting the 
countries'  actual  share  of  the  world market  and  the  level  of  real 
demand,  i.e.  about  20%  of  the market  (incidentally,  under  the 
present Agreement  these  countries  account  for  approximately  20%  of 
BETs,  but  the  tonnages  should  be  cut down  to  about  20%  of  the real 
market); - 13  -
(b)  when  there are  large surpluses,  leading  to  a  slump  in prices  (e.g. 
last autumn's  very  low  prices),  it should be possible to  reduce 
quotas not  simply  to  85%  of  the  BETs,  as  under  the present 
Agreement,  but if necessary to  75-80%. 
In  the Commission's  view,  these  countries  should  also participate in a 
"special stocks
11  type  of  arrangement  like  that under  the  present 
Agreement.  However,  they would  have  a  comparatively minor  part to 
play,  since most  of  the  onus  of maintaining  the  stocking  system would 
be  on  the "great powers". 
(3)  Small  exporters 
These  countries'  combined  exports  are  no  more  than about  500  000 
tonnes,  and  according  to  the  best  forecasts  their production is  not 
expected to  increase significantly.  The  Commission feels  they could 
continue  to  be  entitled,  as  under  the  present Agreement,  to  export  free 
of restrictions at any  time,  up  to  a  ceiling of  70  000  tonnes  a  year, 
or  some  similar figure  to be  negotiated. 
(4)  Importing countries 
A major  snag  with the present Agreement  is  that it places  the whole 
burden of market  stabilization on  the  exporting  countries,  while  the 
importing countries  can exploit all the  advantages  for  their own 
production and  consumption policies.  But  it is not  only  the  exporting 
countries which have  an  interest in the  stabilization of  the  inter-
national  sugar market;  importing  countries  too  need  to be  able  to 
count  on  regular  supplies at  stable prices. 
The  Commission accordingly considers  that  the  importing  countries 
should also give certain undertakings,  as  they  did  under  the  1968  Sugar 
Agreement. 
The  developed  importing countries  (some  European countries,  Canada, 
Japan,  USA,  New  Zealand)  should  share  in the  stocking/destocking of  a 
quantity reflecting their  importance  on  the market  and  also participate 
in the  programme  of  back-up measures  to  be  taken by  the  exporting 
countries  in certain circumstances,  not  excluding  possible action in 
relation to  their policies  on  production and  consumption of  sweeteners. - 14  -
The  developing  importing countries,  in the  event  of  a  shortage,  would 
be preferentially supplied by  the developed  exporting members  (partly 
from  their  stocks),  and  should  give  import  undertakings  similar  to 
those  in the  present Agreement  (access  undertakings). 
The  Commission  considers  that  the basic principles  and  economic  provisions 
outlined above,  particularly  those  mentioned  on pa3es  9  arid  10,  should  enable 
the  Co~~unity  to  play  an  i~portant positive  role  in  the establishment  of  a 
new  international  sugar  agreement. TABLE  I 
I.S.A.  DAILY  PRICE  OF  SUGAR~/ 
f.o.b.  & stowcd_Caribbean Port,  in  bulk 
MONTHLY  AVERAGES:  1976  - 198z 
Month  Calendar  Years 
1976  1977  1978  1979 
January  14.02  8.34  8.77  7.57 
February  13.50  8.59  8.48  8.23 
March  14.79  8.98  7.74  8.46 
April  14.05 - 10.04  7.59  7.82 
May  14.54  8.95  7.33  7.85 
June  12.99  7.87  7.23  8. 14 
July  13.21  7.39  6.43  8.52 
August  10.02  7.61  7.08  8.85 
September  a. 13  7.31  8. I 7  9.90 
October  8.03  7.09  8.96  II. 94 
Novenber  7.88  7.07  8.01  13.68 
Decenber  7.55  8.09  8.00  14.93 
Average  11 • 5 I  8. I 0  7.81  9.65 
Daily Quotations: 
Highest  15.65  10.81  9.30  15.96 
Lowest  7. 10  6. II  6.03  7.41 
SOURCE:  r.s.o.  Records 
ANNEXA 
Mc::-,o(82) 3 
(Restricted) 
1980  1981 
17. 16  27.78 
22.75  24.09 
19.64  21.81 
21.25  17.83 
30.94  15.05 
30.80  16.38 
27.70  16.34 
31.77  14.76 
34.74  11 • 65 
40.55  12.04 
37.81  ll.  97 
28.79  12.98 
28.69  16.83 
43. I 0  31 .87 
14.43  10.61 
a/  Calculated  in accordance with Statistical Rule  S-14(:~)  of  the  1973 
International  Sugar  Agreement  for  1975  to  October  1977.  Following 
the  suspension of  spot  quotations  for  New  York  Contract  No.I!  on  3 
November  1977  prices  for  the  rest of  1977  were  calculated according 
to  ISC-Decisions-10,  item  7(c)  and  for  1978  and  up  to  October  1979 
were  calculated  in accordance with Economic  Rules  611-2  and  611-3 
under  the  1977  International  Sugar  Agreement.  Follo1Jing  a  decision 
1982 
12,90 
13,08 
11.r26 
9,58 
8,.11 
6,84 
7r80 
6,77 
5,77 
5_,.93 
6_,.52 
6,31 
of  the  Executive  Co1nmittee  at its  18th meeting,  ~cw York  Contract  No.I! 
spot  price quotations  which  were  resumed  from  20  August  1979  have  been 
used  in  the  calculations of  the  I.S.A.  Daily  Price with effect from 
10  October  1979  in accordance with article 61,  paragraph  I TOTAL  WORLD 
of  which  EEC 
EAST  EUROPE 
USA 
CANADA 
C.  & S.  AMERICA 
of  which Brazil 
Mexico 
ASIA 
of  which  India 
Indonesia 
China 
Japan 
Philippines 
Saudi Arabia 
AFRICA 
of which  Egypt 
Morocco 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
OCEANIA 
of  which Australia 
Source:  ISO 
ANNEX  B 
TABLE 
SUGAR  CONSUMPTION  ('000  tonnes) 
1975  ] 976  1977  1978 
74  438  79  312  82  626  86  181 
9  794 
16  467 
9  142 
057 
12  950 
4  990 
2  526 
15  332 
3  859 
177 
700 
2  796 
853 
158 
5  100 
716 
500 
185 
215 
004 
778 
II  027 
16  844 
10  000 
964 
13  349 
5  091 
2  675 
16  758 
4  016 
291 
2  ISO 
3  182 
841 
176 
5  505 
804 
520 
250 
305 
013 
781 
10  164 
17  249 
10  361 
112 
13  541 
5  060 
2  677 
19  093 
4  232 
453 
3  150 
3  300 
968 
220 
5  889 
817 
580 
400 
279 
016 
785 
10  855 
17  722 
9  954 
099 
14  107 
5  289 
2  934 
21  163 
5  212 
557 
3  650 
2  887 
087 
260 
6  235 
966 
635 
575 
102 
023 
786 
1979  1980  1981 
89  862  87  850  87  749 
10  813 
17  895 
9  876 
125 
15  129 
6  009 
3  060 
23  333 
6  677 
650 
3  700 
3  200 
159 
270 
6  464 
970 
647 
575 
127 
042 
798 
10  972 
17  761 
9  330 
014 
15  730 
6  264 
3  152 
21  160 
5  042 
500 
3  600 
2  982 
209 
286 
6  868 
050 
664 
700 
291 
018 
783 
10  593 
17  884 
8  900 
941 
15  449 
5  871 
3  261 
21  614 
5  393 
700 
4  !00 
2  747 
134 
320 
7  286 
200 
670 
850 
303 
028 
793 ANNEX  B 
TABLE  2 
SUGAR:  per capita consumption  in kg  (raw sugar value) 
1977  1981 
EUROPE  40.6  40.6 
of which  EEC  38. 1  38.8 
CANADA  47.8  38.9 
USA  46.8  38.7 
CENTRAL  AMERICA  40.7  43.7 
SOUTH  AMERICA  40.9  42.3 
of  which  BRAZIL  44.7  48. 1 
ASIA  8.3  8.4 
of which  JAPAN  29.0  23.4 
AFRICA  13.9  15.2 
OCEANIA  47.3  44.6 
of which  AUSTRALIA  55.8  53.4 
WORLD  20.2  19.6 
Source:  ISO VI-H  \\,~-y,;=--- ANN.t.l\.  .tl 
i  TABLE  3 
TREND  OF  EEC  EXPORTS  OF  WHITE  SUGAR  TO  CERTAIN  DEVELOPING  AND  E.  EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES 
I 
l 
EEC  EXPORTS  Sugar  consumption 
i  (white  sugar  - tonnes)  (raw  sugar value)  ( '000  tonnes) 
I 
I  1977  1980  1977  1978  1979  1980  ~~9:~:~=1  Eastern  USSR  252  872  648  623  11  863  12  I 46  12  209  12  300 
Europe  Poland  - 24  780  I  568  I  627  1  676  I  534  I  34':1 
Africa  Libya  - 25  871  120  130  130  120  100 
Algeria  56  616  88  253  4LI0  470  490  500  550 
Egypt  12  919  120  961  817  966  970  I  050  1  200 
Sudan  5  265  65  284  339  307  372  370  360 
I  Ghana  2  I 93  17  112  55  60  60  50  so  I 
Togo  II  916  18  754  10  13  20  22  25 
Nigeria  325  502  626  965  400  575  575  700  850 
Zaire  2  416  6  966  65  40  65  67  70 
Asia  Syria  3  168  47  294  196  229  282  345  300 
Iraq  12  001  134  970  450  470  487  520  520 
Iran  153  562  615  069  1  142  1  400  I  200  I  150  I  000 
Jordan  12  556  60  735  85  90  95  89  90 
Saudi Arabia  46  178  102  893  220  260  270  286  320 
Pakistan  - 29  303  716  750  782  773  705 
Sri Lanka  2  563  19  077  130  200  235  205  220 
' 
(Source:  Nimexe)  (Source:  ISO) 
899  727  2  645  942 
--------- - ----
(+  I  746  215) ANNEX  C 
WORLD  SUGAR  BALANCE  SHEET  (raw  sugar values  - millions  of  tonnes) 
ITEM  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Initial stocks  27.9  32. I  34.4  40.8  44.8  43. 1  39.7  42 .I 
Production  78.8  82.4  90.4  90.6  89.2  84.6  91.9 
Imports  20.5  22.0  27.0  24.9  25. I  26.5  28.0 
Availability  127.2  136.5  !51. 8  156.3  159. I  154.2  159.6 
Exports  20.6  22.8  28.4  25.0  25.9  26.7  29.0 
Consumption  74.4  79.3  82.6  86.2  89.9  87.9  87.7 
Final  stocks  32. l  34.4  40.8  44.8  43. I  39.7  42. 1 
of which  in % 
of  consumption  43. 1  43.4  49.4  52.0  47.9  45.2  48.0 
Source:  ISO I. 
II. 
III. 
S  U G A R 
I  9  8  I 
Production 
MAJOR  EXPORTERS  44  434 
of which  AUSTRALIA  3  509 
CUBA  7  926 
BRAZIL  8  726 
EEC  15  476 
PHILIPPINES  2  376 
THAILAND  702 
DOMIN.  REP.  108 
ARGENTINA  624 
SOUTH  AFRICA  987 
SMALL  EXPORTERS  (2)  5  621 
OTHERS  41  877 
WORLD  91  932 
Exports 
22  810 
2  982 
7  071 
2  670 
5  344 
278 
155 
864 
709 
737 
477 
5  666 
28  953 
ANNEX  D 
('000  tonnes) 
(raw  sugar value) 
% of market 
78.8 
(I) 
1.6 
19.6 
100 
(I)  Including  I  364m  t  equivalent  to  sugar  imported  from  ACP  countries. 
(2)  Countries  listed  in Annex  II to  the  1977  Agreement. 
Source:  ISO "''"""  11 • 1 • 8 3 
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l. BUDGST  LINE  COl!C!!.1LiED  :  A .2982  CREDIT  ·  P.M. 
2.  ACTION  :  Commission  Communication  to  the  Council  on  negotiations  for  a  new 
International  Sugar  Agreement  CISA) 
3.  LEGAL  BASIS  :  EEC  Treaty,  in particular  .l\rticle 113 
4•  OBJECTIVES  : 
Authorization  for  the  Com~ission to  take  part  in  work  on  negotiating  a  new  ISA 
5.  FIIIAJICIAL  CO!ISEQUUJCE 
5.0 EXPE!JDITU:lE 
FOR  THE  MARJG.'TillG  YEAR  CURRENT  PINA!/CIAL  YEAR  FOLLOWING  FINANCIAL  YEAR 
l  )  .  L1D_Q./,) 
-CHARGED  TO  THE  EC  BUDGET 
:( ~'MI~,Xr;lli~Fk*i0£1!{) 
-CHARGED  TO  NATIOl\AL  ADMINISTR. 
-CHARGED  TO  OTHER  Nl\TIOliAL  CROUPS 
5.1  RECEIPTS 
-(JA~  RESOURC!:S  OF T!!E  EC 
{LEVI E!l/ C\J3TOl·:S  OOTI ES) 
-NATIO~IAL 
YEAR  • J  9.SS. •••••••• 
5.0.1  PLURIA.'iNUAL  PATT::RN  OF  EXPE!'IDITURE 
300.000  ECUS 
5.1.1  PLURIA.'mtJAL  PATTER.!/  0~'  RECEIPI'S 
5o2  ~!l:.'TiiOD  OF  CALCULATION 
300.000  ECUS 
YEAR  •••  1.  c; e.A . ' ..... .  YEAR  , •  .1.~!3.~ .. ,  ••• 
300.000  ECUS  300.000  ECUS 
Calculation based  on  Community  experience as  a  member  of  the International 
Wheat  Council 
~-~~~~~~~~------------------------a-----------------QD------------------------~  6.) CIWDITS  TO  BE  WRITTEN  HITO  FUTURE  BUDGSTS  ?  YES/M~ 
The  amounts  shown  cover  EEC  participation  in  the administrative budget  of  the 
Agreement • 
Any  costs  arising  from  a  stocking  system  will  be  financed,  as  far  as  possible, 
by  respecting  the principle of budgetary  neutrality  within  the  sugar  regime 
(Article 47  of  Reg.  1785/81). 